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Abstract 
 
 This thesis is an analysis of how U.S. arms sales to the Gulf Cooperation Council 
affect the ongoing uprisings in Bahrain and of the short- and long-term implications of 
these weapons sales in the context of American security policy in the Persian Gulf.  
Incorporating academic literature, journalistic articles, government documents, and non-
governmental organizations’ accounts, this paper draws on a variety of different sources 
to provide an inter-disciplinary study.  While the United States government has spoken 
out against the suppression of the protests in Bahrain, the arms agreements it executes 
with the Gulf Cooperation Council strengthens the authoritarian regimes that continue to 
suppress the democratic uprisings in Bahrain.  Considering how these weapons are being 
used, the United States must reconsider the balance between its ideals and interests in 
foreign policy and refrain from providing military aid to authoritarian regimes that use 
such equipment to maintain their control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis does not express the views of the University of Colorado at Boulder, the 
United States Air Force, the advisors of this research, or any of the other organizations 
with which the author is affiliated unless otherwise noted. 
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 5 
Introduction 
On February 14, 2011, men, women and children gathered in a small village just 
outside of the Bahraini capital, Manama,1 demanding an end to the monarchy which had 
promised “sweeping liberal reforms” ten years before. Bahrainis adamantly rejected their 
government2 and soon thereafter the demonstrations enveloped the entire country.  One 
American newscaster described how “In just a few weeks the protests grew to the 
hundreds of thousands–nearly a quarter of Bahrain’s population.”3  Bahrainis in the 
streets declared that they would settle only for a new constitution, the establishment of 
free elections and the end to the al-Khalifa regime.4    The Bahraini Spring had arrived. 
Bahrain, a small island nation in the Persian Gulf, plays a critical role in 
American foreign policy strategy.  There, the United States maintains the U.S. Naval 
Headquarters of the Fifth Fleet, which is responsible for operations in the Arabian Sea, 
Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and parts of the Indian Ocean.5  For this reason, the United 
States maintains a strong diplomatic and military relationship with the Bahraini 
government.  Despite the political unrest and subsequent crackdown on these 
demonstrations, the Bahraini government remains a significant U.S. ally in the Persian 
Gulf. 
                                                
1 Bill Law, "Bahrain Protests Prompt Global Concerns,"  B.B.C. News(2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12471243. 
2 Cortni Kerr and Tobi Jones, "A Revolution Paused in Bahrain,"  Middle East Report(2011), 
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero022311. 
3 Kelly McEvers, "The Crackdown," Washington Monthly 44, no. 3/4 (2012): 34. 
4 James L. Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know  (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 135-36. 
5 U.S. 5th Fleet Commander, "About U.S. Naval Forces, U.S. 5th Fleet," U.S. Naval Forces Central 
Command, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/about.html. 
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 While protesters cried out for a new democratic constitution, the Bahraini 
government, led by King Hamad bin al-Khalifa, offered a different narrative to describe 
the protests.  Spending over $32.5 million on the services of American and British public 
relations firms,6 the Bahraini monarchy described the protests as Iranian attempts to 
subvert the Sunni government.  The Bahraini Independent Commission of Inquiry–a third 
party committee tasked with investigating the protests and the Bahraini government’s 
response that released their report in December 2011–did not find any conclusive 
evidence to support these claims.   
Regardless of their validity, these claims played on the demographic makeup of 
Bahrain.  Although the Bahraini government has not released statistics on the number of 
Sunni and Shia Muslims in its country, the Bahrain Center for Human Rights estimates 
that Shiites could make up as much as 73% of Bahrain’s population.7  The Bahraini 
monarchy, which the British left in power in 1971, however, is Sunni.  Ever concerned 
over the status of potential Iranian nuclear weapons and cognizant of Bahrain’s critical 
role in U.S. operations in the Middle East, President Barack Obama and his 
administration acknowledged the protests early on, but did not support the opposition 
groups as they had in the Arab Spring movements in Egypt or Libya.8   
The ruling Sunni regime responded with overwhelming force.  Working under the 
auspices of a supranational organization called the Gulf Cooperation Council, 
paramilitary and police personnel of the Peninsula Shield Force deployed to Bahrain with 
                                                
6 "P.R. Watch: Keeping an Eye on the Kingdom's P.R.," Bahrain Watch, http://bahrainwatch.org/pr/. 
7 "Religious Freedom for Shia in Bahrain: "Systematic Oppression and Marginalization"," Bahrain Center 
for Human Rights, http://www.bahrainrights.org/node/1442. 
8 Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the 
Making of a New Era  (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2012), 155-56. 
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tear gas9 and tanks from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.10  These forces 
killed more than one hundred and arrested thousands of Bahraini protesters in the 
following months.11  The Bahraini monarchy also fired as many as 3,000 from their jobs 
for participating in the demonstrations.12  James Gelvin, professor at the University of 
California, Los Angeles and author of the recently published book The Arab Uprisings: 
What Everyone Needs to Know, described the events in Bahrain: “For the first time, an 
Arab uprising was put down by the military intervention of foreign powers,” referring to 
the Saudi and Emirati forces.13  
 While many American policy-makers insist that the United States can achieve 
security in the Middle East and low oil prices while simultaneously supporting 
democracy, human rights, and freedom, the events in Bahrain suggest otherwise.  The 
circumstances in Bahrain require the United States to strike a balance between the pursuit 
of state interests and supporting democratic ideals.  The United States has enjoyed a 
strong relationship with Saudi Arabia, thereby ensuring access to oil and containing 
Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf.  To preserve this relationship, however, the United 
States meekly supported the Arab Spring uprisings in the Arabian Peninsula. 
 Like Bahrain, these other Gulf states are prominent U.S. allies and receive 
military-grade weapons, training, and equipment as a result.  A report published by the 
Congressional Research Service refers to Saudi Arabia as the largest purchaser of U.S. 
                                                
9 Rick Gladstone, "Bahrain Is Criticized for Its 'Torrent' of Tear Gas Use," New York Times, August 1, 
2012. 
10 McEvers, "The Crackdown," 35. 
11 Ibid; Reuters, "Bahrain: Opposition Activists Arrested," New York Times, August 3, 2012; Rick 
Gladstone, "Bahrain Is Criticized for Its 'Torrent' of Tear Gas Use," ibid., August 1, 2012; Mehdi Hasan, 
"Lines of Dissent," New Statesman 141, no. 5123; Frederic Wehrey et al., Saudi-Iranian Relations since the 
Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy  (Santa Monica, California: RAND 
Corporation, 2009). 
12 McEvers, "The Crackdown," 35. 
13 Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know, 138. 
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weapons among “all countries except the United States, Russia, European nations, 
Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.”  In 2011, Saudi Arabia spent $33.4 billion 
on American weapons and military equipment.  The United Arab Emirates ranked third 
after India, spending $4.5 billion.14  These two countries are significant financiers and 
suppliers of the GCC and the Peninsula Shield Force. 
 There are several reasons why Bahrain is an ideal case study for such analysis.  
First of all, unlike the other Arab Spring movements in the Middle East, the United States 
has continued to support the Bahraini monarchy throughout the protests.  In order to 
preserve its interests, the United States government has yet to call for the overthrow of 
the King Hamad ibn Isa al-Khalifa regime or align itself with the opposition movement in 
Bahrain.    While American political leaders continue to call for further democracy in the 
Persian Gulf and the greater Middle East, they continue to sign various arms agreements 
with regimes that militarily suppress these movements.  Considering the international, 
regional, and local interests at stake in Bahrain in relationship to the tension between 
American interests and ideals, Bahrain is an ideal case study to analyze the balance 
between interests and ideals that is inherent in American foreign policy. 
 Although U.S. arms agreements with GCC countries allow the United States to 
access inexpensive oil and to contain terrorist organizations and Iranian influence in the 
Persian Gulf, these agreements pose barriers to democratic movements in Bahrain.  GCC 
regimes deployed military and security forces armed with American-made armored 
personnel carriers and other military equipment to suppress the protests in the island 
nation.  While such agreements do achieve American interests in the short-term, they will 
                                                
14 Paul K. Kerr and Richard F. Grimmett, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-
2011," (Congressional Research Service, 2012). 
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create obstacles to building relationships with a future popularly elected Bahraini 
government. 
Methods 
 While academics, analysts, activists, and journalists have published works on the 
uprisings in Bahrain, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and U.S. security policy in the 
Persian Gulf, no one has analyzed these three levels in relationship to one another.  This 
thesis considers the implications of U.S. arms sales in the context of each of these three 
levels.  Drawing from literature published by experts on each of these topics, this sub-
section sets the stage to discuss the influence and impact of American weapons sales to 
the Persian Gulf monarchies by outlining current academic literature that is relevant to 
the subject. 
 Because the Bahraini Spring began only a little more than two years ago, there is 
little academic research published that addresses the demonstrations.  Lin Noueihed and 
Alex Warren, however, managed to publish an analysis of the Arab Spring uprisings in 
their book entitled The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution, and 
the Making of a New Era.  This book, which begins with the protests in Tunisia, moves 
chronologically through the protests and offers particular insight into the motivations for 
the protests, analyzing the role of social media and economic inequality within Arab 
countries.15 
 Aside from Noueihed and Warren, there are only a handful of academics that have 
published peer-reviewed works on the uprisings in Bahrain.  Among them, James 
Gelvin–a professor at the University of California at Los Angeles–published a book 
                                                
15 Noueihed and Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making 
of a New Era. 
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called The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know in 2012.16  His account, which 
documents the demonstrations chronologically across each country, is a useful 
introduction to the protests and what they meant for the Middle East.  Gelvin’s book, 
however, does not address many of the details pertaining to the Bahraini uprisings. 
Associate Professor at George Washington University, Marc Lynch wrote The 
Arab Uprisings: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East.  As the title 
suggests, Lynch offers an analysis of the Arab Spring while arguing that this movement 
will have important consequences moving forward.  Lynch writes, 
By February, the [Obama] administration was well into the process of 
formulating a doctrine making sense of America’s position in the region.  
But then Bahrain and the Saudi-led counterrevolution threw a major 
wrench into the works.  The American position on Bahrain is not difficult 
to understand.  The administration had been working hard on nudging the 
Bahraini palace toward a deal on political reform with the opposition, and 
seemed close to achieving that goal.  But when things went wrong, the 
U.S. found itself unable to reconcile its competing needs.  The U.S. Fifth 
Fleet based in Bahrain, intense Saudi interest, and concerns about Iran 
make it overdetermined that the U.S. would back away from demanding 
change in Manama.  No call that King Hamad had lost legitimacy and 
must leave would be forthcoming.  Realpolitik generated an absolutely 
unavoidable hypocrisy, which then fatally crippled the administration’s 
broader regional stance, especially with the young activists who saw the 
entire Arab uprisings as a unified narrative.17 
 
Although Lynch does recognize how the uprisings in Bahrain differ from the other Arab 
Spring movements, he fails to provide sufficient detail.  For example, Lynch does not 
describe the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia throughout the 
uprisings in Bahrain–an important part in understanding the American response to the 
events in Bahrain. 
                                                
16 Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know. 
17 Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East  (New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2012), 228. 
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 Jane Kinninmont, a research analyst at London’s Chatham House and a regular 
contributor to Foreign Policy magazine, published a much more in-depth account of the 
uprisings in Bahrain.  Her analysis extends beyond the realm of any one discipline, 
incorporating the historical, political, economic, and religious factors, which contributed 
to the frustration prior to the Bahraini uprisings.18  Although Noueihed and Warren, 
Gelvin, Lynch, and Kinninmont do reference the interests and role of the United States 
throughout the demonstrations, their primary focus is the uprisings themselves. 
 While few academics have published peer-reviewed analyses of the Bahraini 
Spring uprisings, a number of academics have turned to academic journals such as the 
Middle East Report published by the Middle East Research and Information Project 
(MERIP) and Jadaliyya.  These journals provide an avenue for scholars to post timely, 
in-depth essays on developments of the uprisings.  Notably, Toby Jones, an associate 
professor at Rutgers University and specialist on Gulf politics, has published a handful of 
articles on the protests in Bahrain in the MERIP publication.  
 Despite little published material on the Bahraini Spring, considerable analysis of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Peninsula Shield Force exist.  The most prominent 
scholar to have analyzed this subject is Anthony Cordesman–the chair of the Arleigh A. 
Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for International and Strategic Studies–who has 
written extensively on the military capabilities of this security organization.19  His works 
include U.S. Forces in the Middle East,20 Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom,21 
                                                
18 Jane Kinninmont, "Bahrain," in Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf Monarchies, ed. Christopher M. 
Davidson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
19 "Anthony H. Cordesman," Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/expert/anthony-
h-cordesman. 
20 Anthony H. Cordesman, U.S. Forces in the Middle East: Resources and Capabilities  (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1997). 
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and Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the U.A.E.: Challenges of Security. 22  While there are 
few individuals who have studied security issues of the Persian Gulf longer than 
Cordesman, his analysis does not call into question U.S. motives or the implications of 
American arms sales.  In recently published online articles and essays, Cordesman 
focuses more on the security concerns of Persian Gulf states, rather than the political 
unrest in many of these countries. 
 Some scholars, such as Jon Michaels, professor at the University of California at 
Los Angeles, have documented how the American military industrial complex supports 
Persian Gulf militaries. Michaels recently published an article called “Private Military 
Firms, the American Precedent, and the Arab Spring” in which he describes how Persian 
Gulf monarchies work with American defense contractors to improve the capabilities of 
their national militaries and internal security forces.23  He does not elaborate, however, on 
the impact these defense contractors have on the Persian Gulf countries themselves or the 
interests of the United States in facilitating these arrangements. 
 Within the body of peer-reviewed literature on American and GCC security 
policy in the Persian Gulf, there is no discussion addressing these security concerns in 
relationship to local politics–particularly the uprisings in Bahrain.  Rather than analyzing 
the Peninsula Shield Force intervention in Bahrain, many academics have focused on the 
relative military capabilities of GCC countries and Iran.  An analysis of U.S. arms sales 
                                                                                                                                            
21 Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom  (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1997). 
22 Anthony H. Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the U.A.E.: Challenges of Security  (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1997). 
23 Jon Michaels, "Private Military Firms, the American Precedent, and the Arab Spring," Stanford Journal 
of International Law, 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDwQFjAB&url=http%3
A%2F%2Fpsm.du.edu%2Fmedia%2Fdocuments%2Frelated_resources%2Fmichaels_private-military-
firms-american-precedent-and-arab-spring.pdf&ei=yhUsUcu_LKfXyAHZhYBg&usg=AFQjCNFxwdd4w-
SCEYsVgle5Epg2J3w0GQ&sig2=ipt-_xlq-R4OcNoT0n97Aw&bvm=bv.42965579,d.cGE. 
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and the role of the GCC in the Bahraini uprising, this thesis is meant to initiate a 
discussion centered on the impact of these security policies on local politics in Bahrain.  
 This thesis incorporates work from academics, journalists, governments, NGOs, 
and policy firms to understand the policies and interests of both the United States and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council in the context of the Bahraini uprising.  By analyzing 
information from a variety of disciplines and sources, this analysis brings to light 
significant questions about the nature of U.S. foreign policy and the sale of American 
weapons in the Persian Gulf.  By selling American-made weapons to Persian Gulf 
countries, the United States achieved many of its interests.  Despite the success of these 
policies, however, the sales of such weapons contradict American ideals and will create 
challenges to achieving American interests in the future.   
Thesis Overview 
 The first section of this thesis, “Historical Context: The Cold War–2003,” details 
American interests in the Persian Gulf, the establishment of the GCC and its security 
concerns, and the formation of the Bahraini monarchy.  This section explains how U.S., 
GCC, and Bahraini interests evolved since the Cold War until the 2003 U.S.-led invasion 
of Iraq as background for the analysis of contemporary events. 
In the next section, entitled “U.S Security Policy in the Persian Gulf after 2003,” I 
explain the three primary goals of American foreign policy in the region as they have 
developed since the invasion of Iraq.  This military campaign, which removed a secular-
Sunni regime, distorted the balance of power between the Shia and Sunni throughout the 
Middle East, having significant consequences for American interests in the region.  
 14 
Additionally in this section, I examine how the United States responded as protests 
known as the Arab Spring exploded across the Middle East. 
Subsequently, in the chapter called “Gulf Cooperation Council Security Policy,” I 
explore the security interests of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)–a prominent U.S. 
Persian Gulf ally–in the context of the Arab Spring.  These common interests led the 
Peninsula Shield Force, the GCC’s paramilitary, to intervene for the sake of maintaining 
order in Bahrain. 
In the final chapter, I examine the impact of American and GCC security policies 
on the uprisings in Bahrain.  After regaining relative control of his country, King Hamad 
established the Bahraini Independent Council of Inquiry to investigate the government 
and GCC response and to also propose reforms that represented the will of the people.24  
While some of these recommendations were implemented, others were left out.  
According to a Congressional Research Service report, “no senior official who might 
have ordered the use of excessive force has been charged.”25  Protesters and Bahraini 
security forces continue to clash on the streets of the island state.  
After the analysis listed above, this thesis concludes that American weapons sales 
to the Persian Gulf monarchies will challenge American interests in the future.  Although 
these agreements achieved United States’ interests in the region, these agreements may 
push Bahraini protesters to cooperate with Iran in order to overthrow the al-Khalifa 
regime.  Not only do these arms agreements contradict American ideals, they will create 
further challenges to achieving U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf down the road. 
                                                
24 Kenneth Katzman, "Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy," (Congressional Research Service, 
2012), 10. 
25 "Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy," (Congressional Research Service, 2012), 14. 
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Historical Review: The Cold War—2003 
American Interests, Bahraini Independence, and The Gulf Cooperation Council 
 Since establishing itself as a superpower in the Second World War, the United 
States demonstrated that it pursues three interests in the Persian Gulf: 1) reliable access to 
reasonably priced oil, 2) domestic security and that of its allies in the region (Israel and 
Saudi Arabia, for example), and 3) a market for U.S. defense contractors and private 
military corporations. 
During the Cold War, United States policymakers sought military agreements 
with Middle Eastern countries, particularly in the Persian Gulf, to contain the spread of 
communism.26  After World War II, the British Empire could no longer afford to 
administer its colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.  As a result, it gradually 
recalled many military forces from this region, forcing the United States to accept a 
larger role in containing the influence of the Soviet Union.  Although the United States 
supported the independence of Middle Eastern regimes from European powers early on,27 
American policymakers pursued much more aggressive military arrangements with the 
regimes in the region to stop and prevent the spread of communism.  Among these 
regimes, the United States established a strong relationship with the Saudi royal family–a 
monarchical regime that shared American disdain for communism and that could supply 
enormous oil supplies to devote to the American economy and the reconstruction of 
Europe after World War II. 
                                                
26 The United States did pursue military facility-lease agreements with Saudi Arabia as early as 1943, see 
{Cordesman, U.S. Forces in the Middle East: Resources and Capabilities, 74.} for details; however, these 
agreements did not last and did not play an important role in US foreign policy until the Cold War. 
27 Jeffrey R. Macris, The Politics and Security of the Gulf: Anglo-American Hegemony and the Shaping of 
a Region  (London: Routledge, 2010), 52; W. Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the 
Persian Gulf Region  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 45-47. 
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In 1968, the British government published an announcement that it “intended to 
withdraw from its historic position East of the Suez [Canal]” in reference to its military 
and administrative presence in Bahrain.28  The United States–which supported the newly 
independent Bahraini government as the British colonists departed–filled the void.  To 
build relationships with these regimes, the U.S. offered arms deals and other aid.  These 
military agreements provided a substantial market for the thousands of companies that 
designed and manufactured military equipment while supporting closer relationships with 
Middle Eastern regimes that desperately needed to establish national effective national 
militaries.  
As Dr. Jeffrey Macris, professor at the US Naval Academy, describes in his book 
The Politics and Security of the Gulf: Anglo-American Hegemony and the Shaping of a 
Region, the United States adopted a different strategy to counter the spread of 
communism in the Middle East throughout the Cold War.  The United States sought to 
attract these states through economic and military aid in opposition to communist 
ideology.  By supplying these regimes with such aid, the United States could maintain its 
influence and ensure that its partners would refrain from implementing communist 
government.  Many of these regimes were authoritarian. 
 Specifically, US foreign policy revolved around a “Twin Pillar” strategy, a 
strategy whereby it developed close relationships with Iran and Saudi Arabia.  These two 
countries shared many differences, but both played important roles in Middle Eastern 
politics.  For example, Iran was (and remains today) primarily Shia, while Saudi Arabia 
is predominantly Sunni. Many American policymakers thought that by supporting the 
                                                
28 David Frank Winkler, Amirs, Admirals and Desert Sailors: Bahrain, the U.S. Navy, and the Arabian Gulf  
(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 125. 
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regimes of these two countries and ensuring their stability, the United States would have 
greater influence in the region than its Cold War nemesis, the Soviet Union.29 
   To the United States, Iranian and Saudi leadership both expressed significant 
opposition to communism.  As the United States worked with the Shah and King Faisal, 
the Soviet Union sought similar relationships with the Baath or socialist parties in Iraq 
and Syria.30 As a result, American policymakers eyed nationalist movements in the 
Middle East with suspicion and relied on the “Twin Pillars” to exert their influence in the 
region in order to prevent the spread of communism.  In exchange, the U.S. government 
agreed to significant military and economic aid packages in the Middle East and 
throughout Europe.  President Harry Truman signed the Mutual Security Act in 1951, a 
law that provided $7.5 billion to foreign countries in order to stop Soviet influence and 
communism.31  As outlined by the Mutual Security Act, the United States also 
established the U.S. Military Training Mission in 1953–a program to facilitate closer 
cooperation and integration of Saudi and U.S. armed forces;32 in 1957, the United States 
reaffirmed its alliance with King Saud’s regime, providing $180 million worth of 
economic and military aid.33 
With the help of Saudi Arabia and Iran, the United States sought to contain 
nationalist movements, particularly Egyptian President Jamal abd al-Nassir’s call for one 
                                                
29 Michael A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America's Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 
1833-1992  (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 88-89. 
30 Mazher Hameed, Saudi Arabia, the West and the Security of the Gulf  (Wolfeboro, NH: Croom Helm, 
1986), 18; Reinhard Schulze, A Modern History of the Islamic World  (New York: New York University 
Press, 2000), 182. 
31 "The Mutual Security Act of 1951," History, Art & Archives, United States House of Representatives, 
http://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/35416  
32 "United States Military Training Mission--Saudi Arabia," United States Military Training Mission, 
http://usmtm.org/about.html. 
33 Alexi Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia  (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 352; 
Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 118-19. 
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unified Arab state, and greater Soviet influence in the Middle East.  In 1955, the Egyptian 
president agreed to a “purely commercial” arms deal with Czechoslovakia to modernize 
the Egyptian military.  The U.S. and Great Britain hurriedly offered competitive 
incentives, including funds for the construction of the Aswan Dam, a structure that would 
significantly improve Egyptian agricultural productivity.  Later in 1955, at the behest of 
the United States and Great Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan signed an agreement 
called the Baghdad Pact, collectively rejecting communism while working together to 
establish peace in the Middle East.34  Nassir, whose popularity exploded across the 
region, rejected this treaty in an attempt to create a non-aligned movement in the Middle 
East, despite economic and financial support his country received from the West.  After 
the United States and Great Britain withdrew their support in retaliation for Egypt’s 
recognition of the People’s Republic of China, Nassir nationalized the Suez Canal in 
1956 to pay for Egyptian modernization efforts including the construction of the Aswan 
Dam without Western support.35 
While U.S. foreign policy strategy focused on Iran and Saudi Arabia, the United 
States also drew closer to the smaller nations in the Persian Gulf, such as Bahrain, that 
had recently gained their independence from the British Empire.  A strategic base for 
military operations across the Middle East and firmly under Saudi influence, Bahrain 
played a critical role in American and British Cold War strategy.   Realizing that it could 
no longer afford or justify its colonies in the Persian Gulf, however, the British Empire 
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left Bahrain with a Sunni government led by Isa ibn Salman al-Khalifa, despite a Shiite 
majority in the country.36 
Al-Khalifa and the rest of the Bahraini monarchy eagerly accepted military 
agreements with the United States after the country gained its independence in 1971.  On 
December 31, 1971, American and Bahraini representatives signed the first of many 
military agreements which allowed “the U.S. to use 10 acres at Jufair to support its 
Middle East Force (MEF) in the Gulf–this included U.S. use of a transmitter and 
antennae, priority use of Berth 1 at the port, waterfront ship repair facilities, and land 
rights, and hanger and office space at Muharraq Airfield.”37  By 1995, the United States 
Navy had moved its Central Command (NAVCENT) to the island country, establishing a 
naval headquarters in Bahrain to oversee all naval operations throughout the Middle 
East.38 
  While the United States pursued various military agreements with regimes 
around the Persian Gulf, many American policymakers overlooked America’s 
dependence on Middle Eastern oil until 1973.  As Mazher Hameed points out in his book 
Saudi Arabia, the West and the Security of the Gulf,  
The oil crisis dramatically altered the lens through which U.S. leaders saw 
the Gulf.  When the shortage was real, rather than potential, the American 
economy paid a heavy toll, even if it was less costly than Europe’s.  As a 
result, U.S. policymakers began to look at the Gulf in terms of the security 
of the flow of oil.39 
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In 1973, American policymakers realized the significance of the Persian Gulf as world oil 
prices rose by 70% in a matter of days.40  Not only was this region strategically located, 
the oil which it produced directly affected the American economy. 
 Although Saudi Arabia profited enormously from the oil embargo, King Faysal–
King Saud’s heir–continued to work closely with officials in the United States 
government, assuring them that the arrangement was temporary.  Like his predecessor, 
Faysal staunchly opposed the Soviet Union and communist influence in the Middle East.  
Saudi Arabia was the first Arab nation to put an end to the embargo by increasing its oil 
production to 1 million barrels per day, single handedly accounting for the shortages in 
Europe and the United States.41  In return for Saudi Arabia’s cooperation, the United 
States agreed to sell $270 million worth of missiles and other military equipment in April 
of 1974.  Less than a month later, the U.S. and Saudi governments agreed to another arms 
deal worth–this one worth $335 million.42 
The “Twin Pillars” strategy changed following the Iranian revolution of 1979.  
Iranians gathered in the streets to protest the regime.  After the Shah fell, a Shiite cleric 
named Ayatullah Khomeini rose to power, eliminating his political opponents and 
establishing a Shiite theocracy in Iran.  Vehemently against the United States, which had 
supplied the Shah’s regime with weapons and economic support, Khomeini and his 
emerging message of Islamic fundamentalism were a new threat to American power in 
the Middle East.  
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In May of 1981, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and the United 
Arab Emirates founded the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).43  The GCC was formed in 
response to the Iran-Iraq War and the Iranian Revolution.  By 1982, Iran had won four 
significant victories over the Iraqi army and threatened the GCC states.  As a result of 
this organization, these states could coordinate a common defense in the event of an 
attack.  Although the United States and the countries of the GCC publicly asserted their 
neutrality throughout the war, these countries sided with Iraq.44 
The stated goal of this organization, which was created in an effort to unite these 
countries based on their common Islamic values and “shared characteristics,” was the 
“complete unification of all six states.”  Despite this aim, however, the G.C.C. dedicated 
itself to the common security issues of its members.45 The United States supported the 
creation of the GCC.  One American Navy commander described, “the United States 
helped bolster GCC naval forces in the region through military sales and agreements to 
conduct joint training exercises.”46 
As British forces left the region, the Persian Gulf became a priority in American 
foreign policy.47  In his 1980 State of the Union Address, President Jimmy Carter 
described the U.S. attitude towards the Persian Gulf: 
Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by any outside force to 
gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on 
the vital interests of the United States.  It will be repelled by use of any 
means necessary, including military force.48 
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While President Carter was referring primarily to the Soviet Union when he gave this 
speech, American presidential administrations have maintained a similar stance since: the 
Persian Gulf must be protected.   
 Foreign ministers of each member state met in Riyadh to draft a charter which 
outlined the goals of the GCC.  The Historical Dictionary of the Gulf Arab States by 
Malcolm Peck describes the four parts of the organization well: 
(1) the Supreme Council, composed of the heads of state, empowered to 
determine general policy and make binding decisions, and required by the 
charter to convene a regular session annually;  
(2) the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes, which makes 
recommendations to the Supreme Council on disagreements over 
interpretation of the charter or disputes between member states;  
(3) the Ministerial Council, made up of cabinet-level representatives of the 
member states who propose to the Supreme Council the means of 
implementing GCC programs; and  
(4) the Secretariat General, headquartered in Riyadh, with a secretary 
general who oversees six directorates–political, economic, legal, financial, 
and administrative, environmental and human resource affairs, and 
information.  The secretariat prepares studies and monitors GCC 
decisions.49 
 
As Professor Mazher Hameed points out, the GCC was founded “largely at Saudi 
initiative”50 and contingent upon military support and oil revenues from the Saudi 
Kingdom51 not long after Saddam Hussein ordered Iraqi military forces to invade Iran in 
September, 1980.52    
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 By 1987, the U.S. had solidified military agreements with Kuwait, Qatar, and the 
United Arab Emirates53 among other arrangements it had already made with Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia as a result of the ongoing war between Iraq and Iran.  Echoing President 
Carter’s State of the Union Address in 1980, President Ronald Reagan and his 
administration made it clear that the United States would ensure the security of Persian 
Gulf waterways, despite the increasing conflict between Iraq and Iran.54  During this 
time, the U.S. military established and upgraded dozens of military installations 
throughout the region.  These bases ensured that the United States would have the ability 
to protect oil resources in the region.  Only several years later, these bases would become 
the foundation of American military operations in the Gulf War. 
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi military forces executed the orders of Saddam Hussein 
to invade Kuwait.55 In the days following the invasion, President George H.W. Bush set 
out to build an international coalition–composed primarily of European and Middle 
Eastern countries–to remove the invading forces.  After assuring King Fahd of Saudi 
Arabia that unlike in previous American military operations in the Middle East,56 the 
United States would “maintain a military presence until the crisis was resolved;” U.S. 
military forces then immediately deployed to the country,57 and to other important U.S. 
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allies such as Bahrain and Qatar.58  As the President explained, “I am determined that 
Saddam [Hussein] will not get away with all this infamy.  When we [the U.S.] work out a 
plan, once we are there, we will stay until we are asked to leave.”59  U.S. military 
personnel remained in Saudi Arabia until September of 200360–over a decade since the 
conclusion of Operation Desert Storm61 and after transitioning to other military bases in 
the Persian Gulf. 
 Having successfully pushed Hussein and the Iraqi forces back to Baghdad, 
however, key U.S. officials decided against removing him from power.  There were 
several important motivations for this critical decision.  As senior American military 
officials have pointed out, an assault on Baghdad would have cost the United States many 
soldiers’ lives and enormous expense.  Additionally, Hussein and his regime provided a 
barrier to greater Iranian influence and the spread of Islamic theocracy and 
fundamentalism.  As Ali Allawi–author of the book The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the 
War, Losing the Peace–describes, Saddam’s regime was “the single most valuable, albeit 
indirect, bulwark against the spread of revolutionary Islam into the Gulf region.”62  
Although Saddam Hussein had threatened the balance of power in the Persian Gulf by 
invading Kuwait, U.S. policymakers allowed him to remain in power.  While Hussein did 
threaten to upset the security balance of the Persian Gulf by invading Kuwait, the United 
States and the GCC member states perceived a far greater threat from Iran. 
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 After Operation Desert Storm officially ended, the country of Bahrain rejoiced, no 
longer living with the fear of Iraqi Scud missiles.  The parties did not last long for the 
American admirals who led this operation because the operation revealed the important 
weaknesses of American military capability.  In the following months, US officers 
continued the ongoing struggle to integrate the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines as a 
united force63–implementing a new doctrine of American warfighting.  By the fall of 
1991, the governments of Bahrain and the United States signed the Defense Cooperation 
Agreement.  This agreement meant that the United States could move many of its 
administrative and aerial operations to a “forty-thousand-square-foot hanger and office 
complex at Bahrain International Airport,” ensuring a larger and more enduring 
American military presence in Bahrain.64  In the months following the removal of Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait, the Bahraini monarchy and the United States government would 
seek further agreements to ensure the security of the Persian Gulf.  
Since the end of the Second World War, American policymakers realized the 
United States’ significant military and economic interests in the Middle East.  As Gary 
Sick explained in his essay, “The United States in the Persian Gulf,” the U.S. pursued its 
own interests “to ensure access by the industrialized world to the vast oil resources of the 
region” and “to prevent any hostile power from acquiring political or military control 
over those resources” in the Persian Gulf.65  In pursuit of these interests, the United States 
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military developed extensive capabilities and became a “Persian Gulf power in its own 
right” by the end of the 20th century.66 
 When four commercial airliners were hijacked over American skies on September 
11, 2001, the agreements the United States had made with its allies in the Persian Gulf 
became much more important.  An immediate invasion of Afghanistan would require the 
use of military bases in the region, particularly the headquarters of the Navy 5th Fleet in 
Bahrain, to execute an operation in response to the attacks.  In terms of Persian Gulf 
politics, however, September 11th did not affect the region so much as the second major 
military campaign of the President George W. Bush administration: the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq. 
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U.S. Security Policy in the Persian Gulf After 2003 
 The 2003 invasion of Iraq had significant consequences for Persian Gulf politics.  
Although GCC member states had strained relationships with the Iraqi dictator, Saddam 
Hussein, they accepted him as a political and religious barrier, ensuring that the Sunni 
Arab regimes maintained their power without a direct threat from Shiite Iran.  When 
Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime fell from power in Iraq, Iran funded many 
development projects in the transitioning state.  The Iranian state took advantage of the 
power vacuum in Iraq.  
 In the fall of the Hussein regime, tension between Shiites and Sunnis exploded.   
Although the U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) sought to build consensus 
among the leaders of Iraq’s diverse populations, political parties formed largely along 
ethnic and sectarian lines.  Mona Damluji–a doctoral student at the University of 
California at Berkeley–described how “a series of political interventions enacted or 
facilitated by the CPA helped produce a political structure that empowered sectarian 
parties” in an essay entitled “‘Securing Democracy in Iraq’: Sectarian Politics and 
Segregation in Baghdad, 2003–2007.”67  As Sunni militants from across the Middle East 
arrived to carry out attacks and suicide bombings on Coalition forces and Shiite 
neighborhoods,68 scores of Shiites formed militias and joined the Iraqi security and 
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defense forces.69  Wrought with sectarian violence, the situation in Iraq spiraled out of the 
control of United States military and Coalition forces. 
 From the beginning, the American-led CPA encountered significant resistance 
from prominent Shia cleric Grand Ayatullah Ali al-Sistani.  A religious scholar with 
significant ties in Iran, many Shiites saw al-Sistani as the Shiite religious leader of Iraq.70  
As the CPA attempted to hand-pick representatives to write Iraq’s constitution, al-Sistani 
issued a fatwa, a non-binding legal opinion, rejecting these actions.  In June of 2003, al-
Sistani stated: 
These forces have no jurisdiction whatsoever to appoint members of the 
Constitution preparation assembly.  Also, there is no guarantee either that 
this assembly will prepare a constitution that serves the best interests of 
the Iraqi people or that it expresses their national identity whose backbone 
is sound Islamic religion and noble social values.  The said plan is 
unacceptable from the outset.  First of all there must be a general election 
so that every Iraqi citizen who is eligible to vote can choose someone to 
represent him in a foundational Constitution preparation assembly.  Then 
the drafter Constitution can be put to a referendum.  All believers must 
insist on the accomplishment of this crucial matter and contribute to 
achieving it the best way possible.71 
 
The U.S. government officials expected Shiite populations and their leadership to show 
overwhelming support for the liberators who brought an end to the treacherous rule of 
Saddam Hussein.  In the aftermath of the invasion, however, Shiite leaders such as al-
Sistani challenged American oversight in the creation of a new Iraqi government.   
 Further complicating U.S. attempts to establish a democratic government in Iraq, 
Hizbullah–a Shiite political party based in Lebanon–seized two Israeli soldiers on July 
12, 2006, starting a war with Israel.  Hizbullah’s aggression towards Israel and Shiite 
challenges to American authority in Iraq contributed to growing concern of the “Shiite 
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crescent,” a term used to describe the increased political influence of Shiism in the 
Middle East.  Authors such as Vali Nasr and Deborah Amos discuss this rise of Shiite 
power and influence as a threat.  This view became popular among senior American 
foreign policy-makers. 
 Although the regimes on the Arabian Peninsula are all Sunni, the eastern reaches 
of the Peninsula have considerable Shia populations.  Each of these regimes has 
emphasized a national identity or sectarian differences within their countries for political 
purposes over the course of their rule.  Today, as Iranian aggression has become a 
significant concern amongst actors in the international community, these regimes have 
reiterated sectarian differences and the rise of the “Shia” as a means to justify the 
suppression of Arab Spring movements in their countries.  The United States and the rest 
of the international community, historically concerned about the threat of Iran and the 
rise of Shiite influence, especially since 1979, seem to accept this justification.   
These concerns significantly influenced the American response to the Arab Spring 
movements, particularly in Bahrain.  Fearful of the continued spread of Islamic–
particularly Shiite–fundamentalism, the United States only supported some of the 
democratic movements.  When American officials recognized these movements, they did 
so with caution.  In the case of Egypt, for example, the United States did not publicly 
endorse the opposition movement until it was clear that President Mubarak had lost 
legitimacy and effective control of the country.  Behind the American response to the 
Arab Spring, there are several interests, which American policies set out to achieve.   
 There are three primary motivations for American security policy in the Persian 
Gulf: 1) access to oil; 2) security of the United States and its allies in the region from 
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terrorism and Iran; and 3) a continued market for the “military industrial complex.”  
Following examination of each of these three motivations, I analyze these motivations in 
the context of the Arab Spring protests to explain the reasons for the United States’ 
security policy in the Persian Gulf. 
Three Motivations for American Security Policy in the Persian Gulf 
Persian Gulf Oil and the Security of Global Crude Oil Prices 
 Since World War II, access to oil has been a primary motivation for U.S. security 
policy in the Persian Gulf.72  After 70 years, 22% of the 18.8 million barrels of oil 
consumed daily in the United States comes from Bahrain, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.73  All of these countries, with the exception of Iraq, 
are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.  Although the United States has decreased 
its reliance on foreign oil in recent years,74 this region remains an important source.  The 
Persian Gulf significantly impacts global oil prices, accounting for 1/5 of the oil 
consumed around the world every day.75 
 One of the United States’ many interests in the Persian Gulf is to secure access to 
this oil.  To accomplish this, the United States has influenced the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (O.P.E.C.).  In his book The Oil Kings, Andrew Cooper 
discusses how the United States under President Gerald Ford and Saudi Arabia agreed to 
remove the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of Iran from leadership of O.P.E.C.76  
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Maintaining a low price of crude oil is a principle aim of U.S. security policy in this 
region.  
 Today, oil from the Persian Gulf remains a key strategic resource for the United 
States.  In the globalized economy of multinational corporations, the United States’ 
interest in securing access to this oil extends beyond its own needs.  Any barrier to the 
crude oil supplied by this region would have a significant impact on world prices for 
crude oil–not only harming the American economy, but the global economy as well.  As 
a result of the increased interdependence of states and their economies, the U.S. has 
interests in ensuring low prices across the world oil market–not only for itself. 
  Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and the U.A.E. also depend heavily depend 
on this waterway.  Constituting the vast majority of the G.C.C., these five countries 
export most of their oil resources through the 34 mile-wide passage.  Out of concern for 
maintaining steady revenues from the supply of crude oil, these countries readily support 
United States’ efforts to police and to protect this area. 
 
Domestic Security, Protecting American Allies, and Iran 
 After the United States deposed Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, Iran gained 
significant influence in Iraq.  Many in Southern Iraq looked to Iran for religious 
leadership.  In the absence of Saddam Hussein and an effective Iraqi national 
government, millions turned to Iran for financial and political support as well.  As 
Noueihed and Warren describe,  
From the point of view of Saudi Arabia and the region’s other Sunni 
rulers, the biggest winner from the 2003 invasion was Iran, which enjoyed 
booming trade, good relations with the Baghdad government, and 
influence among Shiite Islamist groups and militias that it had supported 
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during decades in exile.  In 2004, Jordan’s King Abdullah spoke with 
concern about the rise of what he described as a ‘Shiite crescent’ 
stretching from Iran through Iraq all the way to Lebanon on the 
Mediterranean coast.77 
 
This dialogue resonates with American government officials and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council as Iran threatens to close the Strait of Hormuz and denies inspectors to 
investigate its nuclear capabilities. 
 The vast majority of this oil produced in the Persian Gulf flows through this 34-
mile waterway between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, called the Strait of 
Hormuz.  This strategic passage is a highway for nearly 40% of the world’s tanker borne 
fuel.78  The Iranian government threatens to shutdown the strait to these oil tankers and 
other foreign navies; many analysts and academics agree, however, that such an operation 
is far beyond Iranian naval capability.79  Although the Iranian Navy could not sustain a 
long-term closure of the Strait of Hormuz especially in a confrontation with the United 
States, any disruption to that waterway could raise world oil prices. 
 While the Iranian government threatens to close one of the most economically 
important passageways, the United States, Israel and a host of other countries also remain 
concerned over the status of potential Iranian nuclear weapons development.  Iran Watch, 
a non-governmental organization devoted to “research and public education to stop the 
spread of nuclear weapons, chemical/biological weapons, and long-range missiles,”80 
actively collects and analyzes data on the status of Iran’s weapons program.  In a status 
report uploaded in December of 2012, an Iran Watch analyst describes Iran’s growing 
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stockpile of enriched uranium,81 which may be used to build a nuclear weapon.  But 
despite American and European insistence to the contrary, Iranian leadership still asserts 
that it intends to develop nuclear power to lower its dependence on oil (which it can sell 
abroad) and to create reactors for medicinal purposes.82  Between Iran’s threats to close 
the Strait of Hormuz and claims that the Islamic Republic is developing a nuclear 
weapons capability, the United States and GCC countries perceive the Islamic theocracy 
as a threat. 
 Islamic fundamentalist groups such as al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula also 
challenge U.S. and GCC security interests in the region.  These terrorist organizations 
challenged the authority of monarchical and authoritarian regimes across the Middle East.  
Sharing this threat with many of the reigning governments in the Persian Gulf, the United 
States found numerous allies that eagerly supported the Global War on Terrorism.  As 
Cofer Black, Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism in the President George W. Bush 
administration, described, “I would cite Saudi Arabia as an excellent example of a nation 
increasingly focusing its political will to fight terrorism. Saudi Arabia has launched an 
aggressive, comprehensive, and unprecedented campaign to hunt down terrorists, uncover 
their plots, and cut off their sources of funding.”83  Like Saudi Arabia, Persian Gulf 
countries played an active role in gathering intelligence and attacking terrorist 
organizations throughout the region.  Not only did these groups represent a counter-
movement of Western conceptions of democracy and human rights, they also challenged 
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the Gulf regimes that had built strong relationships with the U.S. and that avoided 
significant confrontation with Israel. 
 In an effort to prevent and to respond to potential Iranian and terrorist aggression 
in the Persian Gulf, the United States and the GCC established numerous arms 
agreements.  Fearful of Iranian hegemony in the region, these regimes (and by extension, 
the GCC) spent eagerly billions of dollars in exchange for a variety of state-of-the-art 
American weapons systems.  The Wall Street Journal reported on September 12, 2010 on 
the single largest arms transaction to a foreign government in United States history.  This 
$60 billion, 10-year deal with the Saudi government included the following combat 
equipment:84 
- 85 F-15 Fighter Jets and a plan to upgrade 70 of these aircraft already 
owned by the Saudi government;85 nicknamed “the Eagle,” this aircraft is 
designed “to gain and maintain air supremacy over the battlefield,” 
according to a website operated by the United States Air Force.86 
- 70 Apache Helicopters;87 according to Boeing–the manufacturer of this 
aircraft–this aircraft is an “advanced multi-role combat helicopter,” 
equipped with machine guns and missiles.88  
- 72 Black Hawk Helicopters;89 also known as the UH-60, this helicopter 
is a “utility tactical transport” aircraft that can quickly move between 
8,000 and 9,000 pounds worth of equipment and personnel to a target.90 
- 36 Little Bird Helicopters;91 designed in either an attack or transport 
variant, this helicopter can transport up to six passengers or engage targets 
with a variety of machine guns and missiles.92 
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A year later, Congress and President Obama executed the agreement and gave the 
authority to Boeing to sell the 85 planes and upgrade another 70 of the current Royal 
Saudi Air Force fleet.  According to the New York Times, this deal was worth an 
approximately $29.4 billion.93  Within a year of the initial signing, the U.S. government 
had fulfilled half of the agreement. 
 Although there were American legislators who opposed the deal initially, 
primarily because it would decrease Israel’s relative military hegemony in the region, the 
deals passed.  Not only would such agreements promote a U.S.-Saudi relationship, they 
also contributed to regional defense against Iranian aggression.  As Professor Gregory 
Gause III stated, “I see this more in the longer-term effort by the administration to signal 
that even with the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, the U.S. is still committed to the 
defense of its allies in the gulf and to the containment of Iran.”94  Despite the end to its 
combat operations in Iraq, the United States will remain a significant military force in the 
Persian Gulf. 
 Professor Gause also pointed to another important dynamic in U.S.-Saudi 
relations.  As the Arab Spring spread across the Middle East, undemocratic Arab 
regimes–such as the Saudi royal family–grew uncomfortable, especially once the United 
States government began supporting popular protests.  These governments understood 
that what happened in Egypt or Libya could happen in Saudi Arabia or the U.A.E.  Gause 
                                                                                                                                            
92 "Ah/Mh-6 'Little Bird'," Military.com, http://tech.military.com/equipment/view/89722/ah-mh-6-
%27little-bird%27.html. 
93 Mark Lander and Steven Lee Myers, "U.S. Agrees to $30 Billion Arms Deal, U.S. Bolsters Saudi Ties,"  
New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/world/middleeast/with-30-billion-arms-deal-united-
states-bolsters-ties-to-saudi-arabia.html. 
94 Ibid. 
 36 
explains, “After some tension-filled months this year over Egypt and Bahrain, both sides 
have agreed to disagree on that [support for popular protests for democratic reform], and 
agree on their common interests.”95  The U.S.-Saudi arms deal, which passed just last 
year, presented an opportunity for the two countries to refocus on the threat of Iran. 
 From the perspective of the Saudi government, the newly acquired munitions 
would serve a variety of purposes.  Shortly after the announcement of this historic arms 
deal, senior officials from the Departments of State and Defense described the Saudi 
government’s intentions for the new weapons.  As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs described, 
The procurement of the new F-15SA, which stands for Saudi Advanced 
aircraft and the conversion of the Saudis’ existing F-15S fleet to a 
common configuration and the possible training contingent in the 
continental U.S. will provide sustained professional contacts as well as 
common training support into the 21st century.  As for the helicopters – the 
Apaches, Blackhawks, and Little Birds – we believe that these versatile 
platforms will be able to conduct a number of critical missions in Saudi 
Arabia that are essential for the Kingdom’s self-defense.  We foresee these 
helicopters providing area security for Saudi military forces, protecting the 
borders, and defending critical energy infrastructure sites and 
installations.96 
 
Andrew Shapiro, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs explained 
how–in accordance with the Arms Export Control Act–“the Secretary of State is 
responsible for providing continuous supervision and general direction of arms sales.  
This includes determining whether proposed arms sales or export of defense articles and 
services are authorized and ensuring that they best serve U.S. foreign policy,”97 
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suggesting that such weapons would only be used to further U.S. interests in the Persian 
Gulf. 
 Although much smaller in scale, the United States has made a variety of other 
arms agreements with the rest of the states that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council.  
In December of 2011, Congress agreed to sell the United Arab Emirates “an advanced 
antimissile interception system,” worth $3.5 billion.98  At the end of last year (2012), the 
U.S. government also approved the sale of a missile defense system produced by 
Lockheed Martin Corporation to Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.99  Then, in May of 
2011, the State Department released a statement that it would resume the sale of military 
equipment to the government of Bahrain, emphasizing that the items would only be used 
in defense of external threats.  As one senior official explained, “We’ve made this 
decision mindful of the fact that there remain a number of serious unresolved human 
rights issues in Bahrain which we expect the Government of Bahrain to address.”100 
 As the United States military pulled back troops from Iraq and Afghanistan and 
Iran threatened Arab regimes, U.S. and G.C.C. governments continued to find common 
ground.  Their mutual concern over the threat of potential Iranian aggression in the 
Persian Gulf led to some of the largest arms deals that the United States–and even the 
world–has ever seen.  The threat of Iran united the governments of the United States and 
the G.C.C. countries more than any other threat or opportunity.  As these governments 
continue to negotiate arms deals, each emphasizes “interoperability” and the 
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compatibility of the militaries operating with one another.  With every deal, the United 
States government solidifies its alliances with the GCC and the regimes, which make up 
the organization.  As is evident in its relationship with Iran, the United States continues to 
ensure its own defense and the defense of its allies–such as GCC member states and 
Israel.   
The Rise of the Military Industrial Complex 
 In addition to oil access and security, supporting the military industrial complex is 
another important motivation for American security policy in the Persian Gulf.  As 
American military forces return home from Iraq and Afghanistan, many of these veterans 
find work in private defense corporations whose primary customer is the U.S. 
Department of Defense.  Faced with a tremendous budget deficit, however, the American 
federal government has withdrawn money from the Defense Department, decreasing the 
amount of business available to such contractors.   
The Arab allies of the Persian Gulf present yet another important opportunity for 
the United States government.  In the era of “fiscal cliffs,” deficit reduction, spending 
cuts, and tax reform, many policymakers have been forced to make significant cuts to the 
defense budget.  For example, due to a host of technological flaws and its enormous price 
tag, the F-35 and many other defense development projects may face an untimely end.101  
Americans who work for businesses such as Lockheed Martin Corporation, Boeing, or 
Northrop and Gruman depend on the $553 billion budget of the Department of 
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Defense.102  Cuts to defense spending may require that the Defense Department modify 
or end its contracts with such defense contractors, which could lead to additional layoffs 
and higher unemployment rates. 
 As the United States military spends less on personnel and equipment, elected 
officials seek to capitalize by selling American weapons systems to the friendly Arab 
regimes in the Persian Gulf.  These oil-rich governments present a direct opportunity for 
American defense contractors to sell their products, thereby continuing to employ 
thousands of Americans.  In a statement released by the White House, Principal Deputy 
Press Secretary Joshua Earnest explained how the $29.4 billion arms deal to Saudi 
Arabia–the first episode of a $60 billion agreement–“will support more than 50,000 
American jobs, engaging suppliers in 44 states, and providing $3.5 billion in annual 
economic impact to the U.S. economy.”103 
 Former commander of the U.S. 5th Fleet and retired Vice Admiral Charles Moore, 
now the Regional President of Lockheed Martin for the Middle East and Africa, 
published an editorial in the Washington Times describing how “the United States and its 
allies need Bahrain more than ever.”  He argues that the Bahraini government plays a 
critical role in helping the United States achieve its security interests.104  The United 
States’ Arab allies in the Persian Gulf not only provide a first line of defense against Iran 
and a steady stream of oil, they also present a market for defense contractors–like Mr. 
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Moore’s current employer, Lockheed Martin105–who desperately seek new sources for 
their products.  Because of these agreements, these Arab governments receive some of 
the most advanced weapons systems that may be used to defend against Iranian 
aggression and to maintain internal security within their countries.  Concern over the 
G.C.C. countries’ access to the international oil market, defending against Iranian 
aggression, and the sale of weapons systems and military equipment are each significant 
areas where the interests of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and 
the U.A.E. overlap.   
The U.S. Response to the Arab Spring 
 On December 17, 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi immolated himself in front of a 
government building in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid.  Protests erupted throughout 
his country and soon ignited in countries throughout the Arabic speaking world.  Less 
than two months after December 17th, President Ben Ali fled the country.106  After 
decades of oppression, thousands gathered in the streets regardless of religion or gender 
and overthrew the authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.  Since that famous 
day, the U.S. government pledged military support to some movements, while focusing 
less attention on others.  As American political leaders voice their support for the 
democratic ideals of such movements while calling for Middle Eastern governments to 
accept greater reform, the United States only seems to support these uprisings when it can 
ensure its interests in the region are not at jeopardy. 
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 Within several months of the initial protests in Tunisia, demonstrations erupted in 
the streets of Cairo and other major cities across Egypt, a country that is home to more 
than 83 million people and often regarded as the center of Arab art, culture, politics.107 
While Egypt’s GDP grew steadily in the years before the Egyptian uprising, Egyptians 
experienced growing inequality.108  Men, women, and children gathered in the streets to 
protest and the Egyptian Ministry of Interior’s secret police met them. 
 As the secret police brutally attempted to suppress the protests, the goal of the 
protests changed.  Egyptians began to call for the end of President Hosni Mubarak’s 
regime.  The situation had escalated to such a degree that Mubarak’s administration 
ordered the Egyptian military to maintain order in the cities.  Despite their orders, 
however, the Egyptian military did not attack the protesters. 
 On February 11, 2011, Mubarak gave a televised speech in which he pledged to 
establish a new government with new ministers and political reform.  He did not give any 
indication that he would step down.  The thousands of protesters gathered in Tahrir 
Square continued to protest and President Obama responded to the speech saying, “The 
Egyptian government must put forward a credible, concrete, and unequivocal path toward 
genuine democracy and they have not seized that opportunity.”  As Noueihed and Warren 
suggest, it was clear that “Mubarak had lost US support.”109  In a matter of days, 
Mubarak stepped down and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces took over the 
country until elections could be held. 
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 The implications of this message were enormous and–to the monarchies of the 
Persian Gulf–menacing.  After a few weeks of internal protest, the United States 
withdrew its support for a government, which had been an ally for decades.  What 
assurance did the governments of countries like Qatar or Bahrain have that the United 
States would not withdraw its support at the first sign of internal unrest?  The U.S. 
withdrawal of its support for Egypt caused significant tension in its relationship with 
Saudi Arabia in particular.  The Saudi monarchy “reportedly threatened to prop up 
Mubarak rather than see him ‘humiliated’ as the U.S. withdrew its support.”110 
 Given Saudi Arabia’s critical role as a primary oil supplier to the United States, 
the U.S. government could not afford to abandon its relationship with the Saudi 
monarchy.  While the discussions between the U.S. and Saudi governments during this 
time are secret, it seems that American policymakers agreed not to focus much attention 
on the Arab Spring in Bahrain and the Eastern regions of Saudi Arabia.  In doing so, the 
U.S. government maintained its strong ties to the Persian Gulf, thereby ensuring its 
access to oil. 
 The U.S. government also refrained from taking a strong position on the uprisings 
in Bahrain.  Despite voicing initial concern over the protests, President Obama’s 
administration has withheld its support for the calls to overthrow the al-Khalifa regime.  
As international concerns grow over the status of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the 
United States also maintains the U.S. Naval Headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, 
which is responsible for operations in the Arabian Sea, Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and parts 
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of the Indian Ocean.111  A center of recent political unrest since February 2011, the 
Bahraini government is also an important U.S. ally in Persian Gulf region. 
 Bahrain’s importance to the United States is not the only factor that made the 
uprisings unique.  While protesters cried out for a new democratic constitution, the 
Bahraini government led by King Hamad bin al-Khalifa advanced a different narrative.  
Spending millions of dollars on the services of American and British public relations 
firms,112 the Bahraini monarchy described the protests as Iranian attempts to subvert the 
Sunni government.  The official claims of the Bahraini regime played on the sectarian 
differences, which have been present since the country’s formation.  Although the 
Bahraini government has not released statistics on the number of Sunni and Shia Muslims 
in its country, the Bahrain Center for Human Rights estimates that Shiites could make up 
as much as 73% of Bahrain’s population.113  Ever concerned over the status of the Iranian 
nuclear weapons and wary of the Bahrain’s critical role in U.S. operations in the Middle 
East, President Barack Obama and his administration acknowledged the protests early 
on,114 but did not support the uprisings as they had during the Arab Spring movements in 
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia or Syria.  
 As Nicolas Kitchen, a doctoral student at the London School of Economics writes, 
“The United States has had to tread a fine line between support for its values–and what it 
conceives as its long-term interests–represented by political reform in the region, and the 
protection of what it perceives as its core regional interests.”115  As a result, the U.S. 
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government’s response to the uprisings in Bahrain has been muted, even in the face of 
what some have called “the worst human rights violations of the Arab Spring.”116  To 
protect and promote its interests in the Persian Gulf, the United States has supported the 
al-Khalifa regime and the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force, two organizations, which 
continue to suppress the democratic protests in Bahrain. 
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Gulf Cooperation Council Security Policy 
The Peninsula Shield Force and the Bahraini Spring 
 Since the Arab Spring erupted in Bahrain in February 2011, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council and its paramilitary organization, the Peninsula Shield Force, attempted to 
downplay the protests in Bahrain.  The role of the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF) was 
critical to the suppression of the uprisings in Bahrain.  Although American interests 
differed from those of the GCC, the PSF intervention achieved both parties’ interests.  
This section analyzes how these interests overlap.    
 One of the primary interests of the GCC is the common defense of its member 
states from Iranian aggression.    As previously discussed, this motivation has been the 
guiding raison d’être for the organization since its founding.  When protesters organized 
in the streets of Bahrain, the GCC labeled the demonstrations as Iranian attempts to 
subvert Arab authority by framing the unrest in sectarian language.  To date (1 February 
2013), the protests that have occurred in GCC countries took place in regions with Shia 
majorities or significant Shia populations. 
 While the GCC member states share common interests with regards to the Arab 
Spring, tensions arose within the organization over how to handle the protests in Bahrain.  
Omanis and Kuwaitis threatened to go on strike, should their governments send in their 
national militaries to suppress the uprisings.117  As a result of significant domestic 
opposition, Kuwait sent its warships to protect the coasts of Bahrain without deploying 
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ground forces.118  Despite the similarities of its member states, the protests in Bahrain 
illuminated some of the tensions within the GCC. 
The Peninsula Shield Force and the GCC framed the political unrest as an 
“external” threat to Bahrain and the rest of the region, suggesting that the uprisings were 
a result of Iranian intrigue.  By labeling the threat as external, the GCC justified the 
deployment of Peninsula Shield Forces to maintain order in Bahrain.  In spite of this 
narrative, Kuwaitis defiantly opposed sending in the Kuwaiti national military to 
maintain order on the ground in the Bahrain. 
 On March 15, 2011, around 4,000 troops of the Peninsula Shield Force rode over 
the King Fahd Causeway in military armored personnel carriers to Bahrain.119  While 
these forces mobilized to support coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, this was the first time the PSF deployed unilaterally.  In an interview 
with a reporter from the London-based newspaper Asharq Alawsat, the commander of the 
PSF Major General Mutlaq Bin Salem al-Azima described the role of the troops in 
Bahrain: 
We have repeatedly confirmed that our mission is to secure Bahrain's vital 
and strategically important military infrastructure from any foreign 
interference. Everybody knows that when a state becomes preoccupied 
with its internal security, this increases its need to secure its international 
borders. Bahrain is part of the Gulf region, and its forces make up part of 
the Peninsula Shield, this means that our undertaking of this task is an 
important and vital part of the role being played by the Peninsula Shield, 
according to the conventions agreed upon by the G.C.C. states. This is our 
role. We understand that the Bahraini security forces – and this is 
something that history attests to – are highly efficient and disciplined, to 
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the point that this situation did not require the utilization of the Peninsula 
Shield Bahraini special forces, which are stationed in certain areas to 
protect the Bahraini borders. This confirms that our forces did not come 
[to Bahrain] due to the internal affairs in the country, but for a more 
important reason [to protect the borders]. 120 
 
General al-Azima made it clear throughout the interview that the role of the PSF was 
exclusively to defend Bahrain from foreign threats and “to help the [Bahraini] 
government to bring goodness, peace, and love to Bahrain.”121   
 Contrary to General al-Azima’s insistence that the PSF did not intervene in 
Bahrain because of “internal affairs,” these forces played a critical role in supporting the 
Bahraini security and military forces that were tasked with suppressing the uprisings.  By 
guarding significant government buildings and infrastructure, the PSF allowed Bahraini 
defense and security forces to devote more equipment and personnel to clear protesters 
out of the Pearl Roundabout, the symbolic center of the Bahraini protest movement.  On 
March 14, 2011,the PSF arrived in Bahrain and by March 18, the Bahraini security 
apparatus had regained control of the capitol.122 
 Contrary to the statements of the GCC, however, there is little evidence to support 
the claims that the uprisings in Bahrain are in any way organized by or connected to Iran.  
Although many of the protesters are Shia, sharing the same faith as many Iranians, 
opposition groups have called for democratic reforms rather than any kind of Shiite 
theocracy.  Although the Bahraini regime labeled the demonstrations as “Shia,” the 
demonstrations–which included Sunnis as well as Shiites–called for regime change and a 
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new constitution.123   When meeting with senior Bahraini government officials, U.S. 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that he “expressed the view that we had no evidence 
that suggested that Iran started any of these popular revolutions or demonstrations across 
the region.”124  The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, a third party review of 
the protests and the Bahraini government’s response, also found no link between the 
opposition groups and Iran, quoting Supreme Leader of Iran Grand Ayatullah Ali 
Khameini who compared the unrest to other Arab Spring movements across the Middle 
East.125  There is still no evidence to support the claim that the protesters had an Iranian 
agenda. 
 After the Peninsula Shield Force intervened in Bahrain, the United States 
remained carefully neutral, asking that all security forces respect the human rights of 
Bahrainis while making it clear that the GCC intervention in Bahrain was “not an 
invasion.”126  Senior U.S. government officials declined to answer specific questions on 
the nature of the PSF intervention in Bahrain.  While the diplomatic discussions between 
the United States and Saudi Arabia during this time were not publicly published, it seems 
likely that the Saudi government would not tolerate American criticism for this 
intervention.  The U.S. government, fearful of jeopardizing its relationship with one of its 
strongest allies in the Middle East, accepted this position. 
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 While the GCC and the PSF maintain that their interests are the security of their 
member states from “external” threats, their current military capabilities do not match 
those of Iran.  In a report, which he submitted to the U.S. Naval War College in 2000, 
U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Glen Kuffel examines the PSF’s capabilities.  He 
writes,  
The Peninsula Shield Force must more fully develop its capabilities as a 
military force before it is able to unilaterally defend the Gulf Cooperation 
member-states’ borders.  Until then reliance on foreign intervention, 
namely from the United States, will continue to be required to support the 
Gulf Cooperation Council’s security needs.127 
 
Since this report was published, the Peninsula Shield Force has still not developed the 
capabilities to defend the GCC member states from potential Iranian aggression.  
Officials of the GCC reported that they expanded the paramilitary organization to 30,000 
soldiers,128 while the latest estimates suggest that there are over 1 million in the Iranian 
military. 129  Even if the PSF responded to a confrontation with Iran, the chances of this 
organization winning would be very slim without the support of the United States. 
 To compensate for their lesser size, Gulf states have augmented their military 
capabilities by turning to private defense contractors.  Jon Michaels, a professor at the 
University of California at Los Angeles, analyzes this trend extensively in a 2012 paper, 
“Private Military Firms, The American Precedent, and the Arab Spring.”  He describes 
how the United Arab Emirates turned to the C.E.O. of Blackwater, Erik Prince, for help 
establishing a special operations force.  Bahrain also turned to private military 
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corporations to hire additional security forces, including thousands of Sunni Pakistanis,130 
to suppress the political unrest there.  As Michaels rightly suggests, the rise of these non-
state militaries could pose significant problems for democratic movements like the Arab 
Spring,131 considering that these multinational corporations offer their services 
internationally without oversight from any one state. 
 Since the PSF intervention in Bahrain, the GCC has continued to organize joint 
military training exercises for the national militaries of its member states.132  
Additionally, the supranational security organization has advanced initiatives to further 
consolidate the GCC’s member states by establishing an economic, political, and military 
union of Gulf countries.  Analysts such as David Roberts of Foreign Policy find this 
arrangement unlikely to come about in the near future, but Bahrain–which is currently 
struggling economically as a result of spent oil reserves–and Saudi Arabia–which is eager 
for greater influence in its neighboring countries–may create a precursor to such a 
union.133 
Regardless of the internal politics between its member states, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council has ensured that the al-Khalifa regime remains in power.  This has 
been primarily a function of Saudi financing and military support.  Whether or not the 
member states the GCC seek further cooperation, it seems that the organization will not 
allow for a transition to democracy in Bahrain.  Honoring its relationship with Saudi 
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Arabia, the United States government has called on the GCC to respect basic human 
rights without significantly challenging its policies. 
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The Bahraini Spring 
 While the U.S. and the GCC have considerable interests in the outcome of the 
political unrest in Bahrain, the motivations for Bahraini opposition groups differ 
drastically.  Many academics and journalists increasingly refer to the protests in Bahrain 
as a failed attempt to overthrow the al-Khalifa regime and implement authentic 
democratic reform.  Despite these claims, however, the protests continue and opposition 
political organizations such as al-Wefaq continue to demand further reform from the 
Bahraini government. 
 To explain the frustrations of Bahraini protesters and how these demonstrations 
came to fruition, this section begins by analyzing the years leading up to the protests.  As 
Noueihed and Warren describe, “the 2000s had been a decade of hope and frustration for 
[many] Bahrainis.”134  In March 1999, Shaykh Isa bin Sulman al-Khalifa, the King of 
Bahrain at the time, passed away.  His son, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, inherited the throne 
after promising reform in the years prior to his reign.135  Many Bahrainis anticipated his 
ascension and King Hamad lived up to their expectations early on in his rule.  He showed 
no hesitation in visiting neighborhoods that were havens of rebellion throughout the 
1990’s.  He allowed the creation of al-Wasat, an opposition newspaper whose name in 
English means “the Center,”136 and instituted the National Action Charter, “a 
constitutional declaration that promised to protect individual freedoms and equality, to 
restore the rule of law and to work towards a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral 
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parliament and separation of powers, ending the strife that had convulsed the country 
since 1994.”137  According to a report published by the Gulf Research Center,  
The Charter . . . made Bahrain a constitutional monarchy, Shaykh Hamad 
the King, and the al-Khalifa family the hereditary rulers of the island.  A 
parliament was to be established with two chambers having equal 
legislative powers: the Council of Deputies consisted of 40 members 
elected by popular vote.  A consultative council, the Shura Council, also 
composed of 40 people but was appointed by the King.  The executive, the 
legislature, and the judiciary were to be separated.  All citizens were made 
equal in the eyes of law, regardless of their religion, sect or social class.  A 
Constitutional Court and Audit Bureau were to be established and enjoy 
full independence.138 
 
The National Action Charter was a document unlike anything else in Bahrain’s young 
history; it decreed the country’s first concrete steps towards democratic government. 
 As King Hamad’s “honeymoon” wore on, however, his regime faced increasing 
challenges.  As opposition “societies”139 such as al-Wefaq–or the Islamic National 
Accord Association140–won seats in parliament, they exposed cases of corruption within 
the Bahraini government and called for further reform.  This exacerbated tensions 
between the Shia and the Sunni as the societies who made such claims were primarily 
Shia.141  Among other hardliners within the al-Khalifa family, King Hamad’s uncle 
Khalifa bin Sulman al-Khalifa, the Bahraini Prime Minister since the country gained its 
independence from Britain in 1971, adamantly opposed reform.142 
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 Al-Wefaq and other opposition groups made allegations that the Bahraini 
government implemented an unfair naturalization policy by opening the borders to 
Sunnis in preparation for the next election cycle143 and refusing Shiites employment in 
the Bahraini Defense Force.144  Amid the calls for reform, the Bahraini monarchy 
withdrew some of the freedoms it had promised and the political situation in Bahrain 
seemed tense when the Arab Spring broke out in Cairo and Tunis.145  Many laws 
proposed by the Bahraini National Assembly stalled between 2006 and 2010 due to “lack 
of consensus,”146 causing further frustration and laying the framework for political unrest. 
 Ten years after King Hamad decreed the National Action Charter on February 14, 
2011, hundreds of Bahraini protesters gathered at the Pearl Roundabout,147 a symbol of 
Bahrain’s history as a pearl exporter in the heart of the capitol city, Manama.148  The 
Bahraini government responded to the protests by sending in security forces, which fired 
tear gas canisters and rubber bullets to disperse the crowds.149  Although King Hamad 
authorized the annual $2,700 stipend to Bahraini citizens, the use of violence enraged the 
protesters.150  On the first day of the demonstrations, one protester had been killed; the 
following day, security forces descended on the funeral procession, leaving a second 
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dead.151  The situation escalated and the demonstrations swelled with thousands of angry 
Bahraini protesters. 
 On March 8th, the opposition groups al-Haq (The Right), Wafa (Fidelity), and the 
Bahrain Islamic Freedom Movement held a news conference at the Pearl Roundabout, 
calling for “the overthrow of the regime and the creation of a democratic republic.”152  
The Bahraini government, which was running out of finances to devote to the expensive 
suppression, met with the GCC, which promised $10 billion to help the monarchy regain 
some control of the country.153  Unsatisfied with the progress, however, the GCC 
mobilized Peninsula Shield Forces to intervene to restore order and “King Hamad 
declared (Royal Decree Number 18), a three-month state of emergency.”154  Freed up by 
the Peninsula Shield Forces, which protected strategic locations, Bahraini security forces 
managed to clear the protesters with batons, shields, tear gas, sound bombs, rubber 
bullets and shotguns from the Pearl Roundabout and to destroy the monument at the 
center by March 18th.155 
 Although the U.S. government opposed the crackdown, it did little to stop the 
intervention.  Concerned that an overthrow of the regime or inaction from the al-Khalifa 
regime would give Iran greater influence in Bahrain, U.S. officials implemented a policy 
whereby they condemned human rights violations without challenging Saudi interests.  
Throughout the uprisings, the U.S. government did not sell missiles, Humvees, tear gas 
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canisters, tear gas launchers, stun grenades and other small arms that were used to 
suppress the protest.156  However, the military equipment previously sold to Bahrain and 
other GCC countries played an important role in the suppression, as NGOs documented.  
According to Bahrain Watch, the PSF and the Bahraini security forces used 12 guage #2 
and #8 birdshot, tear gas, M113 Armored Personnel Carriers, and possibly M4 rifles all 
of American origin.157  Although the U.S. government attempted to prevent Bahraini 
security forces from using American military equipment, it could do little to stop 
previous shipments of such weapons.  Furthermore, the U.S. did not withhold weapons 
from the other GCC countries, which intervened in Bahrain. 
 While opposition estimates range into the hundreds, at least 30 protesters were 
killed from February to May and thousands of Shiites had lost their jobs as a result of 
their participation in the protests.  In April, the Bahraini government shut down the 
opposition paper, al-Wasat, and arrested a variety of well-known human rights activists 
and opposition group leaders.  The GCC Peninsula Shield Force began to depart on the 1st 
of June, the same day that King Hamad ended the state of emergency in Bahrain.  
Beginning on July 1st, the King was offering “unconditional dialogue with the 
opposition.”158 
 In the aftermath of the protests, King Hamad established “a five-person ‘Bahrain 
Independent Commission of Inquiry’ (BICI), headed by highly regarded international 
legal expert Dr. Cherif Bassiouni, to investigate the government’s response to the unrest 
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that began in February, and to file a report by October 30, 2011.”159  Kenneth Katzman, 
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, lays out the 
core principles of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry’s (BICI) findings in 
his report “Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy.”  According to Katzman, the 
BICI report recommended 
• An elected parliament (lower house) with expanded powers, including the 
power to confirm or reject a nominated cabinet; the power to confirm or 
veto the government’s four-year work plan; the right to discuss any 
agenda item; and the power for the full Council of Representatives to 
question ministers on their performance or plans.  In addition, the overall 
chairmanship of the National Assembly should be exercised by the elected 
Council of Representatives, not the Shura Council. 
• A government reflecting the will of the people. 
• “Fairly” demarcated electoral boundaries. 
• Reworking of laws on naturalization and citizenship. 
• Combating financial and administrative corruption. 
• Efforts to reduce sectarian divisions. 
• 82 economic recommendations, including new mechanisms to provide 
food subsidies to only the most needy citizens.160 
 
After the report was published, King Hamad also pardoned some of the approximately 
2,700 protesters who had lost their jobs as a result of their participation in the protests in 
the spirit of reconciliation.161 
 The Bahraini government did implement some of the recommendations made by 
the BICI.  It hired former Miami Chief of Police John Timoney and former Assistant 
Commissioner of the UK Metropolitan Police to help reform the Bahraini security forces.  
The police chief’s critics, however, “say Timoney’s handling of protests and gatherings 
in each of the cities he’s served in are wrought with examples of police abuse, illegal 
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infiltration tactics, fear-mongering and a blatant disregard for freedom of expression.”162  
According to opposition groups such as al-Wefaq, Bahraini government’s attempts at 
reform have been nothing more than publicity stunts.163 
 Protesters continue to protest the Bahraini government, calling for regime change 
and respect for human rights.164  Despite the calls of the opposition, “The sectarian 
dimension taken on by the conflict poisoned Bahraini society in 2011, even though 
divisions in the country had not been simply sectarian in nature,” as Noueihed and 
Warren explain;   
Demands for more political rights had crossed religious divides.  
Historically, both Sunnis and Shiites had been involved in union and 
nationalist movements.  In the 1990’s, Sunnis had joined the calls for the 
restoration of the constitution.  But in the battle for the aftermath of 
Bahrain’s own spring, people who had previously called for unity found 
themselves pressured to join one or another camp.165 
 
The sectarian divisions that currently exist in Bahrain came about as a result the policies 
of the GCC and the Bahraini monarchy.  The United States, which sought to maintain its 
own interests without giving Iran greater influence in the region, remained as neutral as 
possible while its allies enforced their autocratic rule throughout the mass protests for 
democratic reform.   
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Conclusion 
 While protesters continue to demonstrate in Bahrain risking death and injury, 
many journalists and scholars increasingly refer to the Bahraini Spring as a failed attempt 
at regime change.  The Bahraini security forces regularly clash with protesters, but the 
situation receives little attention in the United States or internationally.  Indeed, 
considering the support the al-Khalifa regime has received from the GCC–particularly 
Saudi Arabia–the chances of Bahraini protesters overthrowing the al-Khalifa regime 
seems unlikely in the near future. 
 Despite the challenges in Bahrain, however, the Arab Spring forever changed the 
Middle East, whether or not governments realize the democratic ambitions of their 
peoples.  From Morocco to Bahrain, people stood up to long-standing regimes that failed 
to pursue their interests.  Using new social media in addition to traditional mechanisms of 
protest, Arabs defiantly rejected authoritarianism.  The movement showed that through 
collective action and organization, people across the Arab world can quickly topple 
regimes with considerable military capabilities by nonviolent protests.  
 Despite Arab rejection of authoritarianism, however, the United States has 
maintained many of the same policies it implemented during the Cold War, such as 
siding with dictatorial and monarchical regimes rather than supporting democratic 
movements or supplying regimes weapons in exchange for “good behavior.”  In an era of 
satellite mobile phones, Internet, and social media, the international community may 
reject the United States’ insistence on sacrificing principles to achieve larger interests or 
grandiose goals as American armored vehicles disrupt democratic movements abroad.  
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Furthermore, this policy of selling weapons to the monarchies in the Persian Gulf 
assumes that these regimes will remain in power.  This assumption, however, is 
shortsighted.  The King of Saudi Arabia, for example, is approaching 90 years old; as the 
Economist described in an article published in 2010, there is evidence of tension within 
the family over who will succeed him.166   Perhaps political instability resulting from an 
event like a tumultuous transition from the reign of King Abdullah to that of another 
Saudi king could rapidly alter the balance of power in the region. 
As anyone with a cell phone or computer connected to the Internet has the ability 
to upload photos and video of an American-made armored personnel carrier or American 
ammunition, the United States must take into consideration the value of its brand.  While 
U.S. policymakers frequently promote ideals such as human rights and democracy in 
their speeches and press releases, American policies reflect tangible U.S. interests much 
more than such ideals.   
During his 2013 Inaugural Address, President Barack Obama declared, 
America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the 
globe.  And we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to 
manage crisis abroad, for no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world 
than its most powerful nation.  We will support democracy from Asia to 
Africa, from the Americas to the Middle East, because our interests and 
our conscience compel us to act on behalf of those who long for 
freedom.167 
 
In the Persian Gulf, however, American interests–such as access to oil and the defense 
against Iranian influence–do not align with these ideals or the interests of the protesters in 
Bahrain.  At least in the circumstances of Bahrain, the United States must balance 
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between its interests (such as access to oil) and the ideals upon which the country was 
founded upon.  These goals, however, are contradictory.  To support Bahraini protesters 
opens the door to greater Iranian influence, while to support the GCC and Saudi Arabia 
stands against self-determination and democracy in Bahrain. 
 American policy-makers must be mindful of this balance between interests and 
ideals.  Since the Cold War, the United States has justified many policies to ensure its 
interests or agenda; the sale of American weapons to authoritarian regimes amidst the 
protests in Bahrain could cause significant problems for future U.S. foreign policy in the 
Persian Gulf.  Despite its attempts to ensure that American-made weapons were not used 
to suppress democratic movements in the region, the U.S. government could not control 
the paramilitary and security forces, which deployed with such weapons and military 
equipment.   If Bahrainis do achieve their goals of overthrowing the al-Khalifa regime 
and implementing a democratic government, they will be much more inclined to support 
Iran–a country with similar religion and history–as a result of the U.S. military alliance 
with the Bahraini monarchy.   
Limitations and Counter-Arguments 
 Currently, there is little research or published information that explains how the 
Gulf Cooperation Council and its paramilitary Peninsula Shield Force use the weapons 
and equipment bought from the United States in theaters outside of Bahrain.  This 
subject, in addition to further analysis of the military capabilities of the PSF, deserves 
more attention.  By gathering greater information on the training, posture, and 
capabilities of these forces, the academic community will learn more about the intended 
use of these forces moving forward. 
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While the Bahraini opposition opposes U.S. military sales to the monarchy and to 
the other forces that have suppressed their demonstrations, they may never topple the al-
Khalifa regime and institute a democratic government.  Because of the considerable 
amount of money that Saudi Arabia spends in order to ensure order and stability under 
the monarchy in Bahrain–there is little chance that the opposition could gather enough 
domestic and international support to topple the al-Khalifa regime.  Instead of supporting 
the opposition movement, perhaps the United States should continue to provide weapons 
to the Bahraini regime and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council to achieve its 
interests in the Persian Gulf.  If the chances are so slim that the ongoing protests in 
Bahrain do lead to the overthrow of the country’s leadership, then why should the United 
States deviate from its current strategy if that requires jeopardizing its relationship with 
Saudi Arabia, one of its strongest allies in the Middle East?   
Or, rather than choosing between the opposition and the regime, the United States 
could continue to supply weapons and military equipment while calling for democratic 
reform through the current political structure in Bahrain.  As an analyst at the 
Congressional Research Service summarized,  
The [President Barack Obama] Administration has not called for the Al 
Khalifa [regime] to yield to a political transition.  The Administration 
asserts that there is no justification for doing so because Bahrain’s use of 
force has been dramatically less severe than that used by Muammar 
Qadhafi in Libya or Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and that the Bahrain 
government has a long record of reform.  The Administration asserts that 
is has been consistently critical of Bahrain’s use of force against protesters 
and its continued imprisonment of dissidents.168 
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By maintaining this strategy, the United States may continue to ensure its interests while 
promoting democracy in Bahrain.  Each of these policy options present pros and cons and 
have been considered. 
  
 
 
 While these policy strategies achieve United States’ interests in the short term, the 
sale of American weapons to the Bahraini monarchy and the GCC raise serious long-term 
concerns.  Although American policy-makers attempted to ensure that the equipment sold 
to Bahrain and the GCC in previous arms agreements were not used to suppress the 
demonstrations, American Armored Personnel Carriers rolled through the streets of 
Manama in support of the Bahraini monarchy’s security forces.  This infuriated and 
demoralized many Bahraini protesters calling for a democratic transition. 
 Even if the Bahraini opposition does not succeed in overthrowing the al-Khalifa 
regime and implementing a democratic government, however, images of these Armored 
Personnel Carriers send powerful messages about the intentions of American foreign 
policy around the world, perhaps suggesting that the spread of democracy is not as 
important as the containment of Islamic fundamentalism.  As Arabs continue to struggle 
for democratic governance, U.S. weapons sales to the Bahraini government challenge the 
ideals on which the United States was founded and they will challenge American 
interests in the future.  
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